

SURPRISE AT PEARL HARBOR

A Study in Unpreparedness and Responsibility

by

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I: INTRODUCTION

Some of the most difficult questions posed by visitors to the Arizona Memorial Visitor Center revolve around the state of U.S. intelligence, preparedness and responsibility at the time of the December 7, 1941, attack: Didn't we know the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor? Is it true that President Roosevelt deliberately withheld warning of the impending attack from the U.S. commanders in Hawaii? Were the Hawaii commanders made scapegoats for the mistakes and negligence of higher-ups in Washington?

These questions are difficult to handle for a number of reasons. They are complex and interpretive in nature, making simple "yes or no" answers impossible. They have been the subject of intense debate among historians and political partisans. They were at one time, and to a certain extent continue to be, highly charged and controversial.

The purpose of this paper is not to study the origin of the American-Japanese conflict, but to focus on the questions alluded to in the first paragraph. It is meant to give those of us who work at the Visitor Center a perspective on these issues and the sources of information (and misinformation) about them. With that perspective we can give reasonably well informed responses to visitors who raise those questions.

Probably the most authoritative, exhaustive and balanced treatment is Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.¹ The one which leans most strongly toward the

thesis that the Pacific Fleet was "set up" by President Roosevelt is Pearl Harbor After an Quarter of a Century, by Harry Elmer Barnes.² Barnes is the most extreme of the revisionist historians, those who hold that Roosevelt and his subordinates in Washington must bear the responsibility for unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. One of the books most exculpatory of President Roosevelt and his policies is Leonard Baker's Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor.³ The single most important lode of primary source material is the evidence and transcripts of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.⁴ These works are good starting points for those who wish to pursue the subject beyond the limits of this paper.

In making a wide survey of the literature I found no documentary or testimonial evidence to support the contention that President Roosevelt and his subordinates plotted the destruction of the Pacific Fleet by deliberately withholding warning of a known impending attack on Pearl Harbor. Even those who hold the revisionist position most strongly are forced to concede that point, and are constrained to confine their "proof" to convoluted inference.

This is not to say that there is no ambiguity surrounding the questions of policy, intelligence, warnings and responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. The answers to any historical question worth asking rarely fall neatly to one side or the other. I hope this study will address that untidiness.

II: ROOSEVELT'S POLICIES

Background

In late 1941 Allied victory in World War II was a distant, sometimes doubtful, vision. France had collapsed that Spring before the German Army's stunning offensive. British forces had withdrawn in defeat from the European continent, and the British Isles were in danger of strangulation by submarine warfare. Over this crisis loomed the possibility of German invasion from across the English Channel.

In Eastern Europe Hitler's legions pressed against the gates of Moscow, and the Soviet government hovered on the threshold of disintegration. In North Africa, too, German forces seemed on the verge of victory.

In East Asia Japan dominated large areas of China after four years of war between the two nations. The Chinese government seemed exhausted and incapable of mounting effective resistance.

Although Japan was not at war with England and Russia, she was aligned with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite, or Axis, Alliance. The pact obligated its signatories to come to the aid of any member who became embroiled with a nation not already fighting in the world conflict.

The Axis pact clearly was directed against the United States. Although America was officially neutral, she was giving all assistance short of war to Britain, Russia and China. Besides diplomatic support, the United States, under

the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, gave financial aid, shipped munitions, and even used the U.S. Navy to convoy vital war material to the beleaguered Allies.

Roosevelt's dilemma

But Roosevelt was trapped in a dilemma. He wanted to give as much aid as it took to ensure the survival of the Allied nations, but domestic opposition- exemplified by the powerful and broadly based America First organization- made it politically difficult. Isolationist sentiment, which opposed American involvement in the war, was strong in Congress and among the American public.⁵

As FDR viewed the situation, the United States faced the prospect of watching from the sidelines while the nations fighting the Axis collapsed from lack of outside support. The United States then would be friendless and isolated in a hostile world dominated by Germany and Japan. What could America do then? Submit to the new world order? Or would the President drag a reluctant Congress and nation into a half-hearted commitment to war against long odds? The first alternative was unthinkable, the second would be disastrous.⁶

Revisionist interpretations of FDR's motives

Revisionist historians, less kindly disposed toward Roosevelt's views, have seen the situation differently. Some believe that the President was mesmerized by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was naturally eager to draw the United States into a deeper commitment.⁷ Some also believe that Roosevelt was determined to sacrifice American

interests in order to preserve the British Empire.⁸ Others hold that the President saw American participation in the war as a strategy to consolidate his executive powers into what amounted to an absolute dictatorship- to finish with emergency war powers the process begun with the emergency economic measures of the New Deal.⁹

Revisionists claim that FDR's policy in late 1941 was to maneuver the United States into war by any means available. They maintain that his means toward that end was to provoke one of the Axis powers into striking the first blow against the United States, thereby arousing the American nation to support of the President's belligerency.¹⁰

While even Roosevelt himself conceded that the Pearl Harbor attack solved many of his political problems with one stroke,¹¹ there is no evidence that his policy was directed toward securing that provocation. The position of some revisionists that the President engineered the surprise attack is an unjustified inferential leap from the fact that his policy was served by the attack to the conclusion that he sought the disaster.

III: U.S. INTELLIGENCE

Central to the question of whether administration officials and high ranking military officers expected the Pearl Harbor attack is the subject of U.S. intelligence. What information on Japanese intentions was available? What conclusions were drawn from that information? How were that information and those conclusions utilized?

Organization and functioning of U.S. intelligence

The organization and functioning of American intelligence services left much to be desired in 1941. Professional intelligence officers and intelligence operations enjoyed little prestige and low status within the armed services.¹² As a result, there was a tendency to restrict intelligence operations to the gathering of raw information. The responsibility for evaluating that material, divining Japanese intentions and disseminating information to field commands based on that intelligence generally was reserved by the higher echelons of command.¹³

An example of the low estate of U.S. intelligence at the time is provided by the difficulties in establishing a joint Army-Navy intelligence board in Washington. In July, 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles, head of Army intelligence (G2), and Captain Alan Kirk, chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), proposed the establishment of the joint board. But because of bureaucratic infighting, the body did not meet until after Pearl Harbor. Interservice rivalry at

higher levels took precedence over the need for coordinating Army and Navy intelligence efforts until it was too late.¹⁴

Things were no better in the Hawaii theater than they were in Washington. The intelligence organizations for both services in Hawaii were compartmentalized, confusing and overlapping. The Army's Hawaiian Department had two intelligence organizations, one for the Air Corps and another directly subordinate to the Department's commanding general. The Navy intelligence apparatus in Hawaii had three separate parts. One, Fleet Intelligence, was on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CincPac); another, Counterespionage, was attached to the Fourteenth Naval District; and yet another, Combat Intelligence, was administered directly from Washington and had the mission of tracking the locations of Japanese fleet units through radio interception and call sign analysis.¹⁵

Navy intelligence officers in Hawaii doubted the abilities of their Army counterparts, and communication between the two services was less than total.¹⁶ Additionally, Army G2 in Hawaii was oriented almost exclusively toward the dangers to internal security, rather than external attack.¹⁷

This state of affairs forms the backdrop for the gathering, the use and the misuse of information by the U.S. government in the months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

MAGIC

If the workings of U.S. intelligence were deficient, the wealth of raw intelligence material available was prodigious.

The most spectacular resource was MAGIC, an operation which intercepted and decoded top secret Japanese diplomatic messages. Through MAGIC American leaders read the most confidential messages (encrypted in the top secret Purple code) between the Japanese government and its diplomatic missions in Washington and other foreign posts.

During the weeks of November and early December, 1941, the MAGIC messages painted a picture of rising tensions and the increasing hopelessness of the American-Japanese negotiations being conducted in Washington. The messages to Japanese diplomatic stations gave instructions for the burning of code books and other confidential papers, as well as other indications that Tokyo expected war to break out in the near future. Especially ominous were a number of messages setting deadlines for the success of the negotiating efforts.¹⁸

In retrospect, some revisionists have professed to see in MAGIC clear indications of Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor by surprise.¹⁹ A review of the messages, however, reveals no explicit, or even implicit, statements that a surprise attack on the United States was imminent, nor even that Japan would initiate the war that many on both sides felt was inevitable. Finally, it is worth noting that there was no mention of Pearl Harbor or Hawaii in any of the Purple code messages. In fact, Lieutenant Commander A.D. Kramer, chief Navy translator of the Purple messages, inferred from them that the Japanese were preparing to attack the Kra Isthmus in Southeast Asia.²⁰

MAGIC provided an excellent window into the workings of Japanese diplomacy, not military strategy. That the opportunity was wasted was due to a great extent to the poor handling of the intercepted messages.

Neither the Army nor the Navy commands in Hawaii were equipped with the MAGIC decrypting machines necessary to read the Purple code. Revisionists maintain that the refusal of Washington to provide the service commanders in Honolulu with a MAGIC machine was part of a deliberate attempt to "blind" Lieutenant General Walter Short, the Hawaiian Department commander, and Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. They claim that if Kimmel and Short had had access to the Purple messages, they would have been forewarned and prepared for the Japanese assault.²¹

That contention is dubious. Not only did the Purple messages make no mention of Pearl Harbor, but warning in and of itself is no guarantee of preparedness. The example of U.S. forces in the Philippines is instructive in that regard. The Philippine garrison had its own MAGIC machine. It had even more explicit warning of an impending blow. Because the attack on Hawaii preceded the assault on the Philippines by nine hours, it cannot be claimed that American forces there were caught by surprise. Yet they were no more prepared for the Japanese attacks than were the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii.²²

If lack of a decrypting machine in Honolulu was no great handicap, the restrictions in handling the decoded messages

were. It was necessary, of course, to keep secret from the Japanese that we were reading their mail. However, the security measures surrounding the use of MAGIC were taken to such extremes that they hampered its usefulness.²³

MAGIC messages were circulated to a small list of policy makers and planners. Lower ranking staff analysts who might have made good use of the intercepts were not only denied access, they were kept ignorant of the program's very existence.²⁴ The overzealous protection of the secrecy of MAGIC thus contributed to its underutilization.

Another aspect of security considerations undercutting effective use of MAGIC was the practice of restricting the number of intercepts any recipient could view at any one time. Each message was hand carried to those on the distribution list and returned by the same messenger to the security of central files once the recipient had perused his copy. Because of this system, no policy maker had the opportunity to study the MAGIC messages as a group. That kind of general overview would have been indispensable for an effective analysis of the body of information represented by the intercepts.²⁵

It was almost inevitable that the import of the MAGIC messages would be misinterpreted. After reading the final intercept, received three hours before the beginning of the attack, President Roosevelt was not unduly alarmed. He observed only, "It looks like the Japanese are going to break off negotiations."²⁶

Bomb plot messages

Messages in the Purple code were not the only decoded intercepts available to American intelligence. The so-called bomb plot messages were exchanges between Tokyo and the Japanese consulate in Honolulu requesting and providing detailed information on ship movements and positions in Pearl Harbor. Encrypted in a code of lower priority than Purple, these messages were not considered as significant as the higher level intercepts. Consequently, they were not given such close attention by the U.S. officers who intercepted, decoded and read them.

Revisionist interpretations make much of the neglect of these cables. Admiral Kimmel claims that the bomb plot intercepts, had he known of them, would have alerted him to the Japanese plans to attack his fleet.²⁷ Barnes says that ONI was aware of the messages and deliberately suppressed them as part of a plot to deny warning indicators to the Pacific Fleet. But he admits there is no definite proof of his contentions.²⁸

Bruce Bartlett, another writer questioning Barnes' position, says that no one in high authority ever saw the bomb plot messages.²⁹ Bartlett's contention is supported by the fact that their low priority caused them to be held for up to two weeks before being translated.³⁰

There were other factors, too, which tended to minimize their apparent significance. There was similar cable traffic between Tokyo and Japanese consulates in the Canal Zone,

San Diego, Seattle and the Philippines.³¹ As was true of the Purple code intercepts, the bomb plot messages were never analyzed as a group, making it easy to miss their significance.³²

Finally, G2 and ONI considered them unimportant because American war plans called for the fleet to leave Pearl Harbor as soon as war broke out.³³ Certainly, Army and Navy intelligence officers reasoned, the fleet would have enough time to leave the anchorage before Japanese warships ventured as far as Hawaii.

The winds code

The bomb plot messages were ignored, but there was another set of decoded intercepts which were recognized immediately as a crucial barometer in American-Japanese relations. In mid and late November Japanese overseas diplomatic posts were ordered to destroy their code books and equipment. In order to retain some means of communicating important information to their foreign missions, the Japanese government devised an alternative channel of communication.

On November 28th the Japanese embassy in Washington received from Tokyo a series of instructions in the Purple code establishing an emergency communications system. The system, subsequently known as the winds code, was designed to convey news of an imminent rupture in Japan's foreign relations. The mechanism was to be a false weather report on the daily shortwave broadcasts from Tokyo.

The code was to indicate the breaking of relations with

each or all of the major nations hostile to the Axis. The signals were to be:

North wind, cloudy... Japanese-Russian relations
to be broken

South wind, clear.... Japanese-British relations
to be broken

East wind, rain Japanese-U.S. relations to
be broken.

Upon interception of the November 28th messages, U.S. intelligence and radio monitoring agencies immediately set up a special effort to detect the transmission of any of the winds code "execute" signals.

It remains to this day a subject of historical and partisan debate whether any such signal was intercepted before December 7th, and if it was intercepted, whether it was brought to the attention of American policy makers.³⁴

If revisionists could prove that U.S. monitoring efforts were successful and the East wind, rain message was passed on to high authorities, it would bolster their contention that Roosevelt and his administration had foreknowledge of an impending Japanese attack.

Unfortunately for their case, only one of the many people in a position to know maintained that this was the case. Commander Laurence Safford, chief of decoding operations at Navy headquarters in Washington, claims that the East wind, rain message was detected and passed up the Navy chain of command. But every other witness testified that the American listening stations did not pick it up.

It comes down, then, to a question of whom to believe:

Safford or the other witnesses. Not surprisingly, revisionists tend to believe Safford.³⁵ It has been observed, though, that Safford's testimony was based not on his direct recollection of events, but on notes he made many months after the Pearl Harbor attack.³⁶

The welter of contradictory testimony sheds no definitive light on the question of whether an execute message was ever received and noted by American observers. Probably the best judgement on the issue is that it is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty from the available evidence.³⁷

Even if Americans had picked up a winds execute message, how useful would it have been? In the hurried confusion that marked the week before Pearl Harbor some intelligence officers had only the vaguest notions of what they were listening for and what it meant.³⁸ If East wind, rain were intercepted, what would it have meant to policy makers? That Japan expected war? Or merely a break in diplomatic relations? If it meant war, who did the Japanese expect would initiate hostilities, and where and when?³⁹

The subsequent controversy has obscured the fact that the winds message was not a signal for the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a warning that international relations were deteriorating. There were other signals which indicated more strongly than the winds message that war was approaching.

Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the U.S. fleet in the Philippines, testified, "I have not thought it of much

importance.... (W)e had already been told enough."⁴⁰ Commander A.H. McCollum, head of ONI's Far Eastern division, noted, "(T)here were a number of much more definitive indicators of war."⁴¹

Noise

If the bomb plot and MAGIC messages appear in retrospect to point to the true nature of Japanese intentions, it is important to remember that there were other signs pointing in different directions. Those signs caused American policy makers to be confused and distracted in their efforts to gauge the direction of Japanese policy.

Roberta Wohlstetter calls these misleading signals "noise". She defines noise as irrelevant or false clues and/or estimates which lead analysts to incorrect expectations.⁴² High ranking officials in Hawaii and Washington were distracted by a veritable flood of false signals in the weeks before Pearl Harbor. An awareness of this noise is essential for an understanding of the reasons why U.S. forces were caught by surprise on December 7th.

The Pacific Fleet had many indicators that the Japanese were preparing to attack not Pearl Harbor, but other targets far removed from the Hawaiian Islands. The most important of these signals was a series of reports from many sources, including U.S. naval observers, of large convoys of Japanese warships and troop and supply transports steaming toward Thailand and British and Dutch territory in Southeast Asia. These sightings, accompanied by predictions of an imminent

Japanese attack in Southeast Asia, poured into Pacific Fleet headquarters throughout November and early December.⁴³ These predictions were given credibility by messages from ONI in Washington that Japanese agents were at work in Thailand to provoke disturbances which could serve as a pretext for Japanese intervention.⁴⁴

Throughout much of 1941 the Pacific Fleet also received information indicating that Japan was preparing to attack Russia. As early as July Admiral Kimmel was receiving predictions of a Russian-Japanese war. On July 3rd Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), wrote Kimmel that Japan would "attack Russia within the next month."⁴⁵ On July 31st Stark again predicted that Japan would invade Russia. On that occasion he wrote to another Pacific Fleet officer who forwarded the letter to Kimmel.⁴⁶

Again, on October 16th, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from Stark alerting him to the "strong possibility" of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ These misleading indicators continued to appear in profusion up to the eve of the raid on Pearl Harbor. Lieutenant Commander Edwin Layton, chief of Pacific Fleet Intelligence, later recalled receiving "probably fifty" reports that Japan was preparing to invade Russia.⁴⁸

Russia? Southeast Asia? Where was Kimmel to expect a Japanese move? Everywhere, apparently, but Pearl Harbor. Although the possibility of war between the United States and Japan was never discounted entirely, the burden of the

messages and signals received by the Pacific Fleet was that if Japan moved aggressively she would do so in an area remote from Hawaii. On October 17th (the day after the dispatch to Kimmel alerting him to the "strong possibility" of a Japanese attack against Russia) the CNO wrote Kimmel a personal letter expressing his confidence that the Japanese "are not going to sail into us."⁴⁹

General Short's Hawaiian Department was no less confused. On October 20th the War Department advised him, "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."⁵⁰ During the period immediately preceding the surprise attack the Hawaiian Department received only one indication of a specific geographical direction for Japan's aggressive intentions. On December 2nd or 3rd the department received a report of the Japanese buildup in Southeast Asia which predicted war between Japan and Great Britain.⁵¹

If the commanders in Hawaii were beset by noise, their superiors in Washington were no better off. They, too, were hypnotized by the Japanese convoys and troop buildup in Southeast Asia. War Department intelligence estimates on November 1st and 13th interpreted Japanese moves in Southeast Asia as the buildup for a fresh Japanese offensive campaign in China designed to strike through Yunan Province and cut the strategically vital Burma Road.⁵²

In a joint memorandum of November 27th to President Roosevelt Admiral Stark and his Army counterpart, Chief of Staff General George Marshall, foresaw possible Japanese

attacks against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and the Russian Maritime (Pacific Coast) provinces.⁵³ Less than two weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack the highest officers of the Army and Navy were informing the commander in chief of the armed forces that they contemplated Japanese aggression against nearly every strategic point in the Pacific except Hawaii.

Naval intelligence estimates were no more prescient than the Army's or Marshall's and Stark's joint memo. An ONI estimate of October 16th foresaw possible Japanese invasions of Siberia, Yunan and Thailand.⁵⁴ Another estimate on December 1st predicted an advance into Thailand and possibly the USSR.⁵⁵

These signals were not necessarily incorrect. The Japanese did invade Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya at the same time they attacked Pearl Harbor. In a review of U.S. intelligence before Pearl Harbor they fall into the category of noise not because they indicated the Japanese would not strike Pearl Harbor, but because they distracted attention from the possibility of an attack on the Pacific Fleet. If hindsight makes us critical of those in responsible positions at the time we should remember that intelligence estimates had to be made in the context of a large volume of widely varying and at times contradictory signals. This noise drew their attentions over an enormous geographical range in wildly fluctuating patterns, making

the task of estimating enemy intentions like the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack.

Location of the Japanese fleet

The location of Japan's aircraft carriers was the most important indicator which might have alerted American commanders to the possibility of a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. The Pearl Harbor unit specifically assigned the task of keeping track of the whereabouts of Japanese warships was the Combat Intelligence operation, which deduced the location of Japanese fleet units from the interception and analysis of their radio call signs.

Japanese ships usually changed their call signs every six months, and it took Combat Intelligence some time to identify which signs belonged to which naval units after each change. Just before the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese changed call signs twice, on November 1st and December 1st. Combat Intelligence could make only shaky guesses about the location of Japan's principal warships. On November 25th and again on the 30th, while the carrier strike force was steaming in silence toward Hawaii, Combat Intelligence incorrectly located a Japanese carrier division in the Marshall Islands.⁵⁶ The Japanese further muddled American perception by broadcasting false radio traffic from shore bases in Japan, causing U.S. intelligence to believe mistakenly that major Japanese fleet units were still in home waters.⁵⁷

The confusion caused by the noise of competing signals was thereby compounded by active Japanese steps to confuse

American observers and conceal the location of Japan's major warships. It is little wonder that American estimates of Japanese intentions were inaccurate.

IV: POSITIVE SIGNALS

Although there was a plentitude of noise and other factors which dulled any sense of danger that the Japanese might raid Pearl Harbor, there were still some signals that might have alerted observers to the risk of a surprise attack. These factors consisted of an early report from Tokyo of a rumor about plans for the attack, a long standing general awareness of the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor, and a series of warnings to the commanders in Hawaii just before December 7th.

Peruvian rumor

The single explicit warning that the Japanese were planning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor came, interestingly enough, nearly a full year before the catastrophe. In fact, this signal reached Admiral Kimmel less than a month after the Japanese strategist, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, first tentatively broached the idea on paper to his superiors.

Yamamoto first committed the proposal to writing in an informal memorandum to the Japanese Navy Minister on January 7th, although he had been toying with the idea for several months.⁵⁸ Within three weeks the Peruvian minister in Tokyo had gotten wind of the development and passed the news to his American counterpart, Ambassador Joseph Grew. Grew quickly relayed the rumor to his superiors in Washington, who passed it along to the Navy Department.

Admiral Stark, in turn, notified Kimmel. But in doing so, the CNO discounted the reliability of the report,

expressing his belief that "no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future."⁵⁹

Harry Elmer Barnes, one of the most extreme of the revisionist historians, makes much of the significance of the report from the Peruvian minister. He claims that Washington officials took the report seriously, an assertion belied by Stark's comments discounting the possibility of a surprise attack.⁶⁰ In the absence of any other evidence- and Barnes produces none to support his assertion- there is no reason to believe that this isolated report was given any credence by officials in Washington.

Nor was there much reason to do so. In January, 1941, Yamamoto's idea was still embryonic. It was not until autumn that the final decision was made to open war against the United States with an unexpected raid on the Pacific Fleet. It is ironic that the United States got its only specific warning of Japanese plans too early for it to appear credible.

Theoretical awareness of Pearl Harbor vulnerability

This is not to say that the idea per se of a carrier attack against Pearl Harbor was never considered by U.S. military commanders. The idea had circulated in rather abstract form for several years in American military and naval circles.

In 1936 fleet exercises in Hawaii were conducted on the premise of a surprise Japanese attack.⁶¹ Kimmel's predecessor as CincPac, Admiral James Richardson, recognized

the danger of a surprise attack against the fleet in the constricted waters of Pearl Harbor. He used Lahaina Roads as the regular fleet anchorage, allowing his vessels into Pearl Harbor only when necessary for refueling, repair and resupply.⁶² In November, 1940, Admiral Stark shared Richardson's apprehensions when he warned the Pacific Fleet commander of the need for measures to protect the fleet against "sudden destructive attack."⁶³ This warning came soon after a British surprise attack in which carrier-borne torpedo planes sank a number of Italian warships anchored in the harbor of Taranto.

Admiral Kimmel, too, was aware of the fleet's vulnerability. On January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote Kimmel warning of the danger of an aircraft torpedo assault.⁶⁴ Knox expressed the same fears several months later when he wrote Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor."⁶⁵

Even the specific operational plans for the defense of Hawaii recognized the danger from Japan's carrier fleet. On March 31, 1941, Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger and Major General F.L. Martin, the chief Navy and Army air commanders in Hawaii, presented a joint estimate in which they discussed the danger. They wrote that a Japanese declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. They further declared:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed at present that such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside three hundred miles.

Those in command of U.S. forces in Hawaii and in Washington before the attack have been portrayed sometimes as Colonel (or Admiral) Blimps living in the past and unappreciative of the potential of air power. This decidedly was not the case. Kimmel, Short and their colleagues were well aware of the theoretical possibilities. It is simply that, with the sole exception of the discredited rumor passed on by Ambassador Grew, all the discussions of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor were on an abstract plane, without indications of specific Japanese plans and preparations.

War warnings

Washington alerted the Hawaii commanders as Japanese-U.S. relations deteriorated alarmingly in late November and early December, but those warnings indicated no belief that Pearl Harbor would be a target.

As it became apparent that negotiations could not resolve the outstanding differences between the two nations, and MAGIC intercepts became more and more pessimistic in tone, Stark sent an alert to Admiral Kimmel and the U.S. Navy commanders in the Philippine Islands and the West Coast on November 24th. The message informed Kimmel and the

others of the poor prognosis for the negotiations and mentioned the recent Japanese movements in Southeast Asia (of which Kimmel was aware). It concluded by warning CincPac and the other addressees of the possibility of a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam."⁶⁷ Stark added a request that they show the message to General Short and their other Army counterparts.

Three days later, on November 27th, the CNO sent a stronger alert to Admirals Kimmel and Hart. The opening sentence, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.", set an urgent tone. It announced that negotiations with Japan had "ceased", and informed Kimmel and Hart that "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days" against the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Stark ordered the two commanders to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment" in preparation for war with Japan.⁶⁸

General Short, too, received warnings prompted by the deteriorating relations with Japan. In compliance with Stark's directive, Kimmel's staff passed on the information in the November 24th Navy message to Short's intelligence officers.⁶⁹ On November 27th the Hawaiian Department's intelligence section received a direct message from G2 in Washington advising, "Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected."⁷⁰

On the 27th (the same day as the Navy "war warning") Washington sent Short a message reading, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The dispatch ordered the General, "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary...." and to report to Washington the action taken by the Hawaiian Department.⁷¹ A separate copy of this message was relayed to Kimmel by the Navy Department.⁷²

The next day, November 28th, the War Department sent another message warning of the need to take measures against sabotage, espionage and subversion.⁷³ At the same time, General Martin, Short's Air Corps commander, received a nearly identical message which, in addition, directed him to report back on the measures taken.⁷⁴

Finally, on December 5th, the Hawaiian Department G2 received a cryptic order from Washington to contact the Navy Combat Intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor "regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."⁷⁵ That message, of course, referred to the frantic alert to detect the winds execute signal. The War Department was instructing Army intelligence in Hawaii to contact the Navy for background on the winds code monitoring efforts in order to inform Hawaiian G2 of the situation.

How did Kimmel and Short respond to these warnings delivered on the eve of the surprise attack? Kimmel

considered his fleet to be on a wartime footing even before the first warning message arrived. Consequently, he did nothing more than radio Vice Admiral W.S. Pye, then at sea with the Pacific Fleet's battleship force, that there was danger of war and to be on the alert. There was no increase in air patrols, because Kimmel did not notify Admiral Bellinger, his chief air commander and the officer responsible for long range air reconnaissance, of the warnings.⁷⁶

General Short's Hawaiian Department responded by taking extensive measures against sabotage, espionage and subversion in accordance with the directives from Washington. On November 27th and 29th Short replied to the War Department, declaring that he had alerted his forces, and detailed the internal security measures he had taken. General Martin replied separately on December 4th in the same vein.⁷⁷

The preparations of the Hawaiian commanders were pitifully inadequate against the threat then bearing down upon them in secrecy. But if those preparations were deficient, they were in response to warnings which were too general and too far off the mark to be of any real use.

Nowhere in the Navy warnings was there any hint that Pearl Harbor or the fleet itself might be in danger. The messages from Washington alerted Kimmel to the danger of Japanese attacks in areas distant from Hawaii. They were, in effect, instructions to prepare his fleet for offensive action against Japan.

The warnings to the Hawaiian Department were focused on the dangers of sabotage, subversion and espionage. They failed to indicate any danger of external attack. The theme of danger from within was confirmed by the War Department's failure to make corrective replies when Short and Martin notified Washington of their internal security measures. The December 5th message regarding the winds code was swamped by the air of urgency surrounding the alert for internal dangers, and the Hawaiian Department did not interpret it to signal danger from outside attack.⁷⁸

V: SURPRISE AND RESONSIBILITY

Offensive psychology

If the warnings to the Pearl Harbor commanders fell short of the mark, their deficiencies were only the final links in a long chain of factors which made for unpreparedness on December 7th. One of the strongest of those factors was an offensive psychology which viewed the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as an offensive or deterrent force in being, rather than a potential target for a Japanese surprise attack.

That psychology was detectable at all levels of command, including President Roosevelt himself. He viewed Pearl Harbor as an excellent base for offensive operations and believed that the stationing of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii would have a deterrent effect on Japanese expansionism.⁷⁹ Further, he believed that a withdrawal of the fleet to the West Coast would be interpreted by the Japanese as a sign of weakness and irresolution.⁸⁰

Senior diplomats concurred with the President. Ambassador Grew felt, "to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor would be a confession of weakness." His opinion was endorsed by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles.⁸¹

Navy commanders shared that orientation. Kimmel himself revealed an offensive viewpoint when he wrote to Stark on December 2nd expressing his reservations about becoming "so much concerned with defensive roles that we may be unable to take the offensive."⁸² Washington had done nothing to

dispel that attitude with its war warning of November 27th, in which Kimmel was directed to prepare his fleet for offensive operations against the Japanese fleet.

Underestimation of the Japanese

The offensive orientation that failed to see the Pacific Fleet sitting in Pearl Harbor as a target was complemented by a widespread underestimation of Japanese abilities and daring.

It was the general consensus of the highest American officials that the Japanese lacked the capacity to mount simultaneous offensives in widely scattered areas.⁸³

The Japanese were believed to suffer deficiencies in many capacities vital to the conduct of carrier warfare when, in fact, they outmatched the Americans. Army intelligence estimated Japanese combat aircraft production at 200 per month; the actual rate was 426 per month. Their pilot training was considered inferior, but their trainees averaged half again as many flight hours as American cadets. Japanese carrier pilots each had about 800 hours in the air. The range and speed of the Zero fighter were underestimated, but its performance was superior to that of contemporary U.S. fighters. Japanese sonar was four to five times as powerful as the Americans', and their warships, contrary to American belief, were stable in heavy seas. The aircraft capacity of their carriers, too, was underestimated.⁸⁴

The most serious underestimates were not material, but psychological. U.S. officials doubted that the Japanese

would accept the risks of war with the United States. As Roberta Wohlstetter observed;

The Japanese and American estimates of the risks to the Japanese were identical for the large scale war they had planned, as well as for the individual operations. What was miscalculated was the ability and the willingness⁸⁵ of the Japanese to accept such risks.

The G2 officer of the Hawaiian Department summed up the American attitude of the day when he reflected, "As a nation, we were very cocky and smug. We looked down on the Japanese and never dreamed they would dare strike American soil...."⁸⁶

Myth of Hawaii's invulnerability

If Americans seemed too confident that the Japanese would not and could not attack Hawaii, that confidence was partly founded in a belief in the impregnability of Hawaii. It was defended by two infantry divisions and one of the world's most formidable coastal fortification systems. At the time, it was the best equipped garrison under the American flag.⁸⁷ General Marshall wrote the President in May, 1941, "The island of Oahu, due to its fortifications, its garrison and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.... (A) major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable."⁸⁸

Misdirected focus

With Japanese capacities underestimated and the capacity of U.S. defenses in Hawaii overrated, it was predictable that the nation's leaders would be more concerned with the danger

of war in other areas.

The attentions of policy makers and military leaders were absorbed primarily in the Atlantic and European battle areas throughout 1941.⁸⁹ To the extent that they concerned themselves with the Pacific, their gaze was focused on the possibility of Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia. Japanese convoy and troop movements in the area, and the noise pointing in that direction, convinced American leaders that Japan would make her move in that area.⁹⁰

In Hawaii those officers responsible for the defense of the islands were concerned principally, as we have seen from the war warnings, with the internal threats of sabotage, espionage and subversion.

Ignorance of American policy

The Hawaiian commanders labored not only under the handicap of misdirected focus, but the problem was compounded by the fact that they were ignorant of many of the fundamental points of American policy, strategy and the state of America's foreign relations. They did not have direct access to the MAGIC intercepts. Officials in Washington frequently kept them in the dark, because they themselves often had trouble ascertaining the direction of national policy in the mercurial world situation which prevailed in 1941.⁹¹

Admiral Kimmel was aware of the gravity of the crisis in American-Japanese relations only through second-hand accounts received through the Navy Department. Under those

conditions he felt no urgent need on the eve of the attack to divert long-range patrol planes from training missions in order to provide full air reconnaissance coverage of all approaches to Oahu.⁹²

Where the blame was placed

Given the magnitude of the disaster and the confusion surrounding it, the American public and political leadership demanded to know who was responsible for our unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor.⁹³

The official investigations which immediately followed the attack were conducted by Navy Secretary Frank Knox and a commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Roberts. Both inquiries were conducted hurriedly, and both laid the major burden of responsibility on General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

In 1944 both the Army and the Navy conducted their own investigations, the Army through its Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) and the Navy through a Navy Court of Inquiry. The Army Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry were ordered to investigate the circumstances of American unpreparedness and recommend disciplinary proceedings if they found individual officers to have been derelict in their responsibilities. Their reports tended to distribute blame more evenly than the findings of Secretary Knox and the Roberts Commission. Their conclusions assigned some responsibility to senior officers at the Washington echelon, and did not recommend any court martials or other disciplinary action.

Although it may have suited some in Washington to saddle the entire load of responsibility on Short and Kimmel, it would have been embarrassing to have testimony in open court about the mismanagement and bad guesses in Washington which preceded and contributed to the catastrophe. As a result, no individual was ever formally charged or court martialed for dereliction, negligence or any other form of culpability.

Instead, Short and Kimmel were relieved of command and pressured into premature retirements. Despite the partially exculpatory findings of the Navy Court of Inquiry and the APHB, the reputations of neither officer ever fully recovered from the wide publicity given to the original findings of Secretary Knox and the Roberts Commission. Admiral Stark was relieved of his duties as CNO and transferred to other responsibilities with the proviso that he never again hold a post requiring the exercise of superior judgement in a position of vital responsibility. General Marshall remained Army Chief of Staff throughout the war.

The debate over responsibility for unpreparedness raged for many years, and even now continues to simmer. The question of whether the Hawaii or the Washington command echelon was to blame tended to polarize along political lines. President Roosevelt's enemies sought to discredit him and his administration by fixing responsibility at the Washington level. Roosevelt's supporters

preferred to point toward the Hawaii commanders.

The best conclusion we can draw from this debate is that these partisan arguments shed more light on the configuration of American politics than on the question of unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor.

Conspiracy?

Despite the plethora of evidence which explains the mundane reasons for the failure to be prepared at Pearl Harbor, there persists a quasi-underground current of opinion which holds that the disaster was the result of a conspiracy on the part of Roosevelt and his closest advisors. This interpretation maintains that FDR and others in Washington had specific foreknowledge of the attack and that they deliberately withheld that knowledge from General Short and Admiral Kimmel in order to have a pretext to move the nation into active participation in World War II. That this view persists is evidenced by the questions and comments along those lines from visitors to the Arizona Memorial.

Most revisionists, it is true, assess Washington's responsibility without claiming that Roosevelt was guilty of criminal conspiracy. They confine their examinations to the factors of indecision, poor management, faulty judgment and simple incompetence at the Washington level. But there still remains more than a trace of suspicion that the President knew the details of the impending attack and willfully kept his Hawaii commanders in ignorance.

The magnitude of that charge demands that it be examined.

Harry Elmer Barnes repeatedly puts forth that accusation: "(I)t appeared necessary to prevent the Hawaiian commanders from taking any defensive action which would deter the Japanese from attacking Pearl Harbor."⁹⁴ "Steps were taken to insure that the Hawaiian commanders... would not be forewarned of any impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."⁹⁵ "Roosevelt was in all probability informed by December 4th" of the Japanese plans.⁹⁶ Barnes, however, offers no supporting evidence, and concedes, "There is no definitive documentary evidence which has thus far been revealed and fully proves [emphasis in original] that Roosevelt had been informed by December 4th that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor as the first act of war."⁹⁷

Admiral Kimmel, with an understandable stake in the acceptance of revisionism, claims that the failure of the Navy high command to send him every scrap of available intelligence "must have been in accordance with high political direction."⁹⁸ He terms that failure an "affirmative misrepresentation."⁹⁹ But nowhere does he present evidence of "high political direction" to "misrepresent" the situation to him.

Kimmel's defender and former subordinate, Rear Admiral Robert Theobald, sees the omission to provide Kimmel with a MAGIC decoding machine as the keystone of the conspiracy to keep the Pacific Fleet commander in the dark. He calls it "a deliberate act... part of a definite plan" to ensure

surprise on December 7th.¹⁰⁰ But Theobald produces no evidence for his charges.

George Morgenstern, in a book commissioned by the virulently anti-Roosevelt publisher of the Chicago Tribune, expresses similar convictions without offering evidence to back them up. He claims that the MAGIC intercepts seen by FDR and his advisors "pointed unmistakably to attack at Pearl Harbor December 7,"¹⁰¹ despite the demonstrable fact that the MAGIC messages made no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor or the impending attack. Indeed, it was a secret so tightly guarded within the inner circles of the Japanese government that none of the recipients of the Purple code messages in the Japanese embassy were aware of the plan. Morgenstern persists in maintaining that FDR and the high command in Washington "had clear and indisputable evidence long before December 7 that Japan was going to fight and that it would open the war on the date that it did at the place that it did."¹⁰² Like Kimmel, he insists that the lack of a flood of every bit of intelligence from Washington "can yield to no other explanation than a desire to do nothing that would deter or forstall the overt incident so long and so fervently sought."¹⁰³ He claims, "Enough has been uncovered to provide the shadowy outline of a monstrous, unbelievable conspiracy."¹⁰⁴ He has uncovered nothing more than unsupported accusations.

Bruce Bartlett, a moderately revisionist writer, is critical of the handling of intelligence and policy decisions

in Washington, but rejects the theory that FDR was a knowing and willing accessory to the destruction of the Pacific Fleet. He writes, "Such a conclusion cannot be sustained by the evidence. (N)owhere is there any conclusive evidence that Roosevelt anticipated an attack on Pearl Harbor. If anywhere, an attack was expected in the Philippines. Evidence that is cited to the contrary is largely based on hindsight."¹⁰⁵

One of the problems with the conspiracy theory is that it requires its adherents to believe that a sizable number of people, in addition to the President, were involved in the plot. Specifically, it would require that the highest officers of the U.S. Army and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the CNO, be parties to a treasonous conspiracy resulting in the destruction of major units of their forces and the deaths of thousands of their subordinates. While President Roosevelt may have had a legion of enemies willing to believe any accusation against him, the involvements of General Marshall and Admiral Stark are different matters entirely.

The proponents of the conspiracy theory have found in the record of events preceding the attack an apparently inexplicable anomaly in the behavior of General Marshall. The final MAGIC intercept, decoded on the night of December 6th, indicated that the diplomatic crisis had reached a head (although it contained no hint of a surprise attack on Hawaii). Army General Staff officers felt it urgent that

General Short be notified of this development, but they needed Marshall's authorization before dispatching the warning.

Marshall, however, arrived late at his office on the morning of December 7th because he had been horseback riding. Adding to that delay, the warning was dispatched by Western Union's commercial cable lines, rather than the Army's radio communications system. The resulting delay caused the message to reach Short several hours after the attack. Extreme revisionists have been suspicious of these circumstances, particularly the decision to send the message by Western Union instead of by faster means. Barnes, for one, has no doubts about the reason for the delay. Marshall, he writes, "put his loyalty to the President above his loyalty to the military services and his country."¹⁰⁶

But the real reasons are more prosaic. The Army's radio transmitter which would have been used to send the message was broken, and the Chief of Staff declined for security reasons to use the telephone to contact General Short. In casting about for alternative means of communication, Marshall chose Western Union, because his communications officers assured him that the message could be delivered to Short within 30 to 40 minutes.¹⁰⁷

It is worth noting that, although Western Union's failure to deliver the message as quickly as expected caused

it to arrive after the attack, it is doubtful that timely delivery would have enabled the Hawaiian Department to be much better prepared.

That episode illustrates the fundamental defect in the conspiracy theory. Its adherents can adduce no direct documentary or testimonial evidence for their case. Instead, they infer malice from simple bungling and human fallability.

Responsibility in perspective

Unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor can not be explained by conspiracy in Washington, but the conclusions of the APHB and the Navy Court of Inquiry cast doubt on the first reports which assigned the blame to the Hawaii commanders. Where, then, does responsibility lie?

Some evidence examined here indicates that much of the responsibility lies with the high command in Washington. Officials there failed to keep Kimmel and Short fully apprised of diplomatic developments which brought Japan and the United States closer to war. Those responsible for informing the Hawaiian Department and the Pacific Fleet of increasing tension couched their alerts in language so general as to be useless as warnings of danger to Hawaii.

They seriously underestimated Japan's capacity and willingness to mount the surprise attack, and at the same time, retained an unjustified confidence in Hawaii's invulnerability. They failed to respond to Short's notices that his command was on guard against internal security threats, confirming his belief that danger threatened from

within, not from without.

Finally, Washington relayed to Hawaii reams of incorrect and misleading intelligence estimates, leading Short and Kimmel to believe that if the Japanese struck, the blow would fall thousands of miles from Hawaii.

Those in authority did accept some portion of their responsibility. The Naval Court of Inquiry and the APHB, both composed of high ranking officers, were critical of their services' high commands. The reassignment of Admiral Stark under conditions restricting his future responsibilities was an implicit concession of his partial responsibility. So was the admission of a senior Army General Staff officer of his responsibility for failing to follow up on Short's report of an internal security alert.¹⁰⁸ Even members of President Roosevelt's White House staff conceded his ultimate responsibility as commander in chief of the armed forces, admitting he was as culpable as any of his subordinates in failing to perceive the approaching danger.¹⁰⁹

Yet, some responsibility must be borne by the Hawaii commanders. Kimmel put his fleet into Pearl Harbor routinely, despite Richardson's precedent of keeping it in more open waters as a precaution against surprise attack. Kimmel likewise failed to take any additional precautions after the war warning of November 27th ordering him to execute a "defensive deployment."

On the Army side, the Hawaiian Department stubbornly remained transfixed by imaginary threats of sabotage,

espionage and subversion, despite messages from Washington which indicated that the forces of the Japanese Empire were preparing a major overt offensive.

Finally, even the staunchest defenders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short must admit that they were among the most senior officers in the U.S. armed forces, and as such, they bore the responsibility for the safety and protection of their commands and for making independent judgments half a world away from Washington. One of Short's staff officers wrote of that responsibility in words that apply equally to Kimmel: "(T)he commanding general had the responsibility of making up his own mind what should be done and not having to rely on what somebody back in Washington might have said...."¹¹⁰

It is apparent from the evidence that exclusive responsibility cannot be placed on any one individual or echelon of command. There were errors of perception and judgement up and down the chain of command. Some of those errors are attributable to specific persons, some to specific groups of people, and others were shared by all involved. Perhaps the most notable aspect was that mistakes tended to resonate, amplify and reinforce one another as they passed from echelon to echelon.

The question of who should shoulder the guilt for unpreparedness is moot, now that more than a generation has passed. But the question of responsibility, of analyzing

and identifying the contributory factors, will always be a legitimate subject of historical inquiry. That responsibility is shared by flawed decision making and command procedures, and by everyone, both in Hawaii and in Washington, who participated in those processes.

Too much can be made of the image of individuals trapped in an imperfect system, for systems are the products- and hence the responsibilities- of human beings. Until we achieve a state of human perfection we can expect fallibility, and sometimes disaster, from both our systems and ourselves.

VI; AFTERWORD

It might seem remarkable that an historical subject as thoroughly dissected as the Pearl Harbor attack should be the focus of so much doubt and confusion. There are, however, identifiable reasons for the longevity of such fundamental questions.

The first of those is the national sense of shock from the disaster. It seemed to many that a catastrophe of that magnitude had to have a simple and diabolical explanation. Few Americans were prepared to admit that the Japanese could have executed such a stunning achievement without monumental villainy or incompetence on the part of U.S. officials.

Another reason for the suspicion that there was "something funny" about the unpreparedness was the air of secrecy which surrounded the wartime investigations of Pearl Harbor. At the time there were good reasons for that secrecy. World War II was still in progress. Public discussion of the details of U.S. military and naval affairs was out of the question, as was any account of American losses which might be useful to enemy intelligence.

The most important secret to be kept was the fact that American intelligence had broken Japan's Purple code. In the months before- and after- Pearl Harbor U.S. officials regularly eavesdropped on top secret Japanese

communications. Inquiries into American code-breaking operations naturally were part of the investigations into American unpreparedness.

At the same time, it was obvious that the Japanese would lose no time in changing code systems if they learned that the Allies could read their most secret transmissions. Therefore, the Pearl Harbor investigations were conducted in the strictest secrecy in order to ensure continued access to high level enemy communications.

Secrecy begets mystery, and mystery begets confusion. Hence the secrecy of the wartime investigations was misinterpreted by those who inferred that the security measures were part of a plot to suppress evidence of official responsibility for the disaster.

A final contributing factor toward the adoption of a devil theory was that a convenient "devil" was readily at hand. Franklin D. Roosevelt was one of the most controversial American Presidents in recent history. Although he was elected chief executive four times, his enemies never wavered in their hatred of "that man".

Those enemies nurtured an image of Roosevelt as an amoral manipulator determined to bring America into World War II at all costs. They claimed he knew where and when Japan would attack, and accused him of deliberately withholding that information from his field commanders in order to produce a shock of such magnitude as to sweep away any

remaining domestic opposition to American entry into the war.

It has been said that truth is the first casualty in war. If examples are needed, the controversy over responsibility for Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly continue to serve for many years to come.

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¹ Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision, passim.

² Barnes, Harry Elmer, Pearl Harbor after a Quarter of a Century, passim.

³ Baker, Leonard, Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor, passim.

⁴ Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, passim. Hereafter cited as Hearings.

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⁵ Baker, passim.

⁶ Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, pp. 429-30.

⁷ Morgenson, George, Pearl Harbor, the Story of the Secret War, passim.

⁸ ibid., passim.

⁹ Barnes, passim.

¹⁰ ibid., p. 83; Morgenson, p. 283; Theobald, Robert A., The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, the Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack, pp. 5-6; Flynn, John T., The Final

Secret of Pearl Harbor, p. 4.

III

¹¹ Sherwood, p. 428.

¹² Wohlstetter, p. 70.

¹³ ibid., p. 279.

¹⁴ ibid., pp. 286-89.

¹⁵ For a description of intelligence organizations in Hawaii, see ibid., pp. 28-40.

¹⁶ ibid., p. 63.

¹⁷ ibid., p. 65.

¹⁸ For a summary of MAGIC intercepts, see ibid., pp. 28-40.

¹⁹ Morgenson, p. 13.

²⁰ Hoehling, A.A., The Week Before Pearl Harbor, p. 156.

²¹ Theobald, pp. 38-39.

²² Hoehling, p. 145

²³ ibid., p. 58; Wohlstetter, p. 176.

²⁴ Wohlstetter, p. 186.

²⁵ ibid., pp. 180, 187.

²⁶ Hoehling, p. 168.

²⁷ Kimmel, Husband E., Admiral Kimmel's Story, p. 83.

²⁸ Barnes, pp. 24-25.

²⁹ Bartlett, Bruce R., Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946, p. 55.

III
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- ³⁰Hoehling, pp. 74-75.
³¹Wohlstetter, p. 213.
³²ibid., p. 214.
³³ibid., p. 287.
³⁴For a concise discussion of the winds code issue, see Bartlett, pp. 98-115.
³⁵Morgenstern, p. 219; Barnes, p. 34.
³⁶Bartlett, p. 103.
³⁷ibid., p. 115.
³⁸Thorpe, Elliott, East Wind, Rain, p. 52.
³⁹Wohlstetter, pp. 216-17.
⁴⁰Hoehling, p. 205.
⁴¹ibid., p. 207.
⁴²Wohlstetter, p. 387.
⁴³ibid., pp. 48-49.
⁴⁴ibid., p. 55.
⁴⁵Hearings, Part 16, p. 2171.
⁴⁶ibid., Part 16, p. 2176.
⁴⁷ibid., Part 14, p. 1402.
⁴⁸ibid., Part 10, p. 4856.
⁴⁹ibid., Part 16, p. 2214.
⁵⁰ibid., Part 14, p. 1389.
⁵¹Wohlstetter, pp. 62, 64.

- ⁵²Hearings, Part 14, p. 1362.
⁵³ibid., Part 14, p. 1083.
⁵⁴ibid., Part 15, p. 1815.
⁵⁵ibid., Part 15, p. 1775.
⁵⁶Wohlstetter, pp. 40-41.
⁵⁷ibid., p. 393.

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- ⁵⁸Agawa, Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral, Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, p. 219.
⁵⁹Kimmel, p. 36.
⁶⁰Barnes, p. 24.
⁶¹Wohlstetter, p. 68.
⁶²Thorpe, p. 14.
⁶³Morgenstern, p. 63.
⁶⁴ibid., pp. 81-82.
⁶⁵Hoehling, p. 32.
⁶⁶Hearings, Part 15, p. 1437.
⁶⁷ibid., Part 14, p. 1405.
⁶⁸ibid., Part 14, p. 1406.
⁶⁹Wohlstetter, p. 64.
⁷⁰Hearings, Part 14, p. 1329.
⁷¹ibid., Part 14, p. 1407.
⁷²Wohlstetter, p. 46.
⁷³Hearings, Part 14, p. 1330.
⁷⁴ibid., Part 14, p. 1330.
⁷⁵ibid., Part 14, p. 1334.

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⁷⁶ Wohlstetter, p. 66.

⁷⁷ ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁷⁸ ibid., p. 63.

V

⁷⁹ Hoehling, pp. 37-38.

⁸⁰ Wohlstetter, p. 81.

⁸¹ Hoehling, p. 139;
Morgenstern, p. 63.

⁸² Hearings, Part 16, p. 2256.

⁸³ Wohlstetter, p. 268.

⁸⁴ ibid., pp. 337-38.

⁸⁵ ibid., p. 354.

⁸⁶ Hoehling, p. 210.

⁸⁷ Wohlstetter, p. 218.

⁸⁸ Hearings, Part 15, p. 1635.

⁸⁹ Wohlstetter, p. 230.

⁹⁰ Barnes, p. 51.

⁹¹ Wohlstetter, pp. 56-57, 321.

⁹² Hearings, Part 32, p. 570f;
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⁹³ For an incisive study of
the Pearl Harbor investi-
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Martin V., The Shadow of
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Controversy over the Sur-
prise Attack, 1941-1946,
passim.

⁹⁴ Barnes, p. 18.

⁹⁵ ibid., p. 20.

⁹⁶ ibid., p. 84.

⁹⁷ ibid., p. 83.

⁹⁸ Kimmel, p. 4.

⁹⁹ ibid., p. 83.

¹⁰⁰ Theobald, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰¹ Morgenstern, p. 13.

¹⁰² ibid., p. 167.

¹⁰³ ibid., p. p. 328.

¹⁰⁴ ibid., p. 219.

¹⁰⁵ Bartlett, p. 63.

¹⁰⁶ Barnes, p. 92.

¹⁰⁷ Hoehling, p. 176.

¹⁰⁸ Morgenstern, p. 256.

¹⁰⁹ Sherwood, p. 435.

¹¹⁰ Hoehling, p. 207.